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interpretation to the provision, it is easier to find cases from other jurisdictions
supporting the finding in the principal case.
The result obtained in the principal case and by Mr. Loy's reasoning is a de-
sirable one in terms of public and social policy. In regard to the community in
which the educational institution is located, the presence of such an institution has
a tendency to raise property values, which would offset the loss to the city or
county caused by exempting the property of the school. It has, also, always been
the policy in California to encourage educational institutions through the medium
of tax exemption, since they are very much in the interest of the state.
The most realistic and authoritatively founded approach to reach this result
is obtained by interpreting the constitutional provision on exemption of educa-
tional institutions from taxation in such a way as to conclude that the exemption
encompasses all property owned by educational institutions and applying the
"used exclusively" clause only to income, which would have to be so used to
exempt it from taxation.
Ralph L. Coffman
FAIR TRADE ACTS: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NON-SIGNER CLAUSE
Fair Trade Acts in general state that a manufacturer of a commodity bearing
a trade mark may legally contract with retailers to set a minimum retail price
without violating state anti-monopoly or anti-trust laws. There is a provision in
these acts, referred to as the non-signer clause, that binds all retailers selling this
commodity to the price set by these contracts whether or not they are a party to
the contract, so long as they have notice of them.
In Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Electric Co.,- a South Carolina retail dealer
in electrical appliances sought to have the constitutionality of the state Fair Trade
Act2 determined in an action for a declaratory judgment. The defendant was a
manufacturer of electric appliances which bore his trade mark and were sold to
distributors and retailers on a national basis. Pursuant to the South Carolina Fair
Trade Act3 this manufacturer had entered into written agreements with a number
of retailers, under which the minimum prices were established. The plaintiff was
not a party to any of these agreements, but according to the Fair Trade Act he was
bound to the same price control as the-retailers signing such agreements.4 Although
noting that a majority of state supreme courts and the United States Supreme
Court 5 have held Fair Trade Acts constitutional, the South Carolina Supreme
Court declared6 the statute was void in so far as it applied to non-signers as being
a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the state
constitution.
Fair Trade Acts had their birth during the depression following 1929. The pur-
pose of these acts was to eliminate the devastating price-cutting wars which were
being waged by retail merchants. The effect of these price wars on the market was
to eliminate small retailers and injure the manufacturer's sales. In order to coun-
199 S.E.2d 665 (S.C. 1957).
2 CODE oF LAWS o SouTH CxOIaNA §§ 66-91 to -95 (1952).
3 Ibid.
4 Id. at § 66-94.
5 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
6 Supra note 1.
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teract these marketing evils California passed the first Fair Trade Act in 1931. 7
However, many retailers refused to sign a price-fixing contract with manufactur-
ers, fearing that they would be left holding the bag unless their competitors became
signers. Therefore, in order to make Fair Trade legislation effective there was
added a non-signer clause in 1933,8 which bound all retailers having notice of the
stipulated price whether they had signed price contracts or not. Since 1933 forty-
five9 states have adopted a Fair Trade Act modeled after the California statute.'0
Among the forty-five states, the highest courts of twenty-six" have considered the
constitutional questions raised by the act. Fifteen of these have held them consti-
tutional,'12 while eleven states have struck them down. 13 The box score results
seem to place the "weight of authority" in favor of upholding the constitutionality
of Fair Trade Acts. However, it must be noted that since 1952, of the jurisdictions
considering the problem for the first time, only four states have upheld them,14
while nine have found them unconstitutional.' 5 This seems to indicate a recent
trend away from the "weight of authority."
The constitutionality of Fair Trade Acts have been attacked on several
grounds, but the predominate one has been that they violate the due process
clause of state constitutions. Since all Fair Trade Acts are identical, for all prac-
tical purposes, 16 and almost every state constitution has a due process of law pro-
vision similar to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitu-
tion,17 it seems strange that these decisions are so divergent.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina said' 8 that the Fair Trade Act, in so far
as it applies to non-signers, is unconstitutional as a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. The line of reasoning of the court was that the right of an
owner to fix the price at which he will sell his property is an inherent attribute
of property itself.' 9 That is, when the manufacturer sells the commodity to the
retailer, the property passes completely and unconditionally to the buyer. Thus,
assuming that the retailer has a right to set the price at which he will sell his own
property, how can the state deny this right? The only justification would be that
this act is a reasonable and proper exercise of the state's police power. In order
to fall within the scope of the police power, the Fair Trade Act would have to bear
some relationship to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the people.
However, the court noted that the act applies to all trade marked commodities
whether or not they affect public interest, and its operation is controlled solely
by the manufacturer without giving any voice to non-signing retailers. For these
reasons the court takes the position that this legislation is not within the scope of
7 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16900-05.8 Id. at § 16904.
9 The three states not adopting Fair Trade legislation are Missouri, Texas and Vermont.
See 19 A.L.R.2d 1139 (1951).
'o Supra note 7.
11 For compilation of cases see Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Electric Co., supra note 1 at
668.
12 Cal., Conn., Del., Ill., Mass., Md., Miss., N.C., N.J., N.Y., Pa., S.D., Tenn., Wash. and
Wis.
13 Ark., Colo., Fla., Ga., Mich., La., Neb., Ore., S.C., Utah, and Va.
14 Del., Mass., Pa., and Wis.
15 Ark., Colo., Fla., Ga., La., Mich., Neb., Ore., S.C., Utah, and Va.
16 19 A.L.R.2d 1140 (1951).
17 16A CJ.S., Constitutional Law § 568 (1956).
18 Supra note 1.
19 Id. at 681.
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the state's police power, and, therefore its effect is to deprive the non-signing re-
tailers of their property without due process of law. This position is ably summed
up by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Cox v. General Electric Co.:
"The scheme ... permits a manufacturer, under the guise of protecting his property
in a trade name or trade mark, to control the price of his product down through the
channels of trade into the hands of the ultimate consumer, and into the hands of a
person with whom he has no contractual relations whatever. This statute dearly vio-
lates the provisions of the due process clause of the Constitution of the State of
Georgia."2o
In the leading case of Max Factor v. Kunsmnan,21 the California Supreme
Court took the opposite view and held that the Fair Trade Act does not violate
the due process clause of the California Constitution. It is admitted that the stat-
ute permits the manufacturer to fix the minimum resale price without giving the
retailer a voice. However, the manufacturer can not arbitrarily set the price. The
act specifies that it applies only to commodities which are in "fair and open" com-
petition with commodities of the same general class produced by others.22 There-
fore, the price is still controlled by the ordinary conditions of a free market. The
court, apparently, felt that a manufacturer who spends money building up his
trade name has such an interest in his commodity that it is worthy of protection.
This protection is given where his interest is most vulnerable, that is, at the retail
level. There the large retailers, those dealing in many commodities, will cut the
price of a brand name item in order to attract customers into their stores to sell
other commodities. Therefore, the small retailers, those dealing in only a few com-
modities, are forced to lower their price on the manufacturer's item in order to
compete with the large retailers. The result of this price cutting is that the margin
of profit earned by all retailers is so small that they will not "push" these com-
modities. Obviously, this damages the manufacturer's overall sales and eliminates
many small dealers. The court said:
"The statute ... is aimed at protecting those valuable property and contract rights of
the manufacturer or producer-rights just as valuable and just as much entitled to
protection as the rights of the retailer who is attempting, by exercising his claimed
right of freedom of action, to injure the property and contract rights of the manu-
facturer or producer."2 3
As to the objection that the act applies to commodities not affected with public
interest, the court finds that the purpose of the act is not to fix prices of certain
commodities on the retail level. Instead it is designed to prevent certain marketing
practises which the legislature feels is harmful to the general welfare of the public.
Granting that the public interest may not be affected by the price of a particular
make of washing machine, it is affected if the conditions under which that washing
machine is sold will injure the manufacturer and many small retailers. On this
point the court said:
"The basic theory on which this concept rests is that, from a social standpoint, price
cutting, in the long run adversely affects the public interest...,,24
20 Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 291, 85 S.E.2d 514, 519 (1955).
215 Cal.2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936), aff'd, 299 U.S. 198 (1936).
22 Supra note 7.23 Supra note 21 at 464, 55 P.2d at 185.24 Id. at 460, 55 P.2d at 181.
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